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 Abstract  Prior to Namibia’s Independence in 1990 tourism on communal land in 
Namibia was dominated by white-owned businesses. Tourism brought little beneﬁ t 
to the people living on the communal land. They mostly had menial jobs as cleaners 
and gardeners or possibly as cooks. In 1996 the Namibian Government introduced 
legislation that gave communal area residents rights over wildlife and tourism on 
their land if they formed common property resource management institutions called 
conservancies. The conservancies have become central in the evolution of new insti-
tutional arrangements for community involvement in tourism. One of the main ways 
in which conservancies earn income is through “joint venture” tourism development 
in some form of partnership with the private sector. This chapter ﬁ rst considers the 
evolution of the conservancy institutional approach. It then compares different mod-
els of community involvement in tourism in relation to issues of community owner-
ship, exposure to business risk and maximising income. 
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2.1  Introduction 
 Tourism plays a pivotal role in the current Namibian economy. Yet, at Namibia’s 
independence from South African rule in 1990 the tourism sector was little devel-
oped. It was geared mainly towards white Namibian and South African self-drive 
tourists visiting state-owned protected areas such as Etosha National Park. Tourism 
to communal areas was limited and mostly took the form of camping freely in the 
bush without facilities. There were a limited number of tourism lodges in communal 
areas. Although communal land was reserved for people from black ethnic groups 
based on the South African  apartheid system, white business people could access 
communal land through a Permission to Occupy (PTO) certiﬁ cate issued by the 
government. This system was used by white business people to gain access to sites 
on communal land to develop small lodges for tourists. 1 These tourism develop-
ments brought little beneﬁ t to the people living on the communal land. They mostly 
had menial jobs as cleaners and gardeners or possibly as cooks. The proﬁ ts went to 
the white-owned businesses which paid a low rental fee to the government for their 
PTO. Local people were disempowered, lacked control over what they thought was 
their land and were objects of spectacle for tourists. 
 More than 20 years after independence, the Namibian tourism sector has under-
gone a major transformation. It is one of the fastest growing economic sectors. 
Travel and tourism contributed USD 630 million or 14.2 % to GDP in 2004 includ-
ing direct and indirect impacts (NTB  2008 ). By 2011 the total contribution of travel 
and tourism to GDP had risen to USD 1.6 billion or 20.3 % of GDP (Ruggles-Brise 
and Aimable  2012 ). The proﬁ le of visitors has also changed with many more tour-
ists coming from outside southern Africa, particularly Germany, France, the United 
Kingdom, Italy and the United States (MET  2013 ). According to a recent survey, for 
Namibia wildlife was the most signiﬁ cant attractor for holiday tourists and for this 
segment game viewing was the most popular activity (undertaken by 65 %), fol-
lowed by nature/landscape tourism (59 %) (MET  2013 ). However, while signiﬁ cant 
changes have taken place since independence, the tourism industry still remains 
largely white-owned and the government is pressing for change in the ownership 
proﬁ le. On communal land such change is beginning to take place through the emer-
gence of new institutional arrangements that have enabled rural communities to 
become part of the Namibian travel and tourism industry in ways that would have 
been impossible under South African rule. 
 This chapter ﬁ rst presents the main institutional features of the conservancy 
approach, followed by a discussion of how this approach came about in Namibia. The 
chapter then considers how conservancies are engaged in different tourism venture 
models and what the strengths and weaknesses of each model are. The chapter contin-
ues by discussing how conservancies contribute to wildlife management and commu-
nity development, and the related governance challenges in managing conservancies. 
1
  The PTO system has since 2002 been replaced by the issuing of leases for tourism businesses on 
communal land by Communal Land Boards established under land legislation. 
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2.2  The Conservancy Approach and Its Main Institutional 
Features 
 In 1995 the Namibian Cabinet approved a new conservation policy on ‘Wildlife 
Management, Utilisation and Tourism in Communal Areas’. This policy aimed at 
giving rights over wildlife and tourism to residents of communal land through the 
formation of a common property resource management institution called a conser-
vancy. The following year legislation was passed by the Namibian Parliament put-
ting this policy into effect. The Nature Conservation Amendment Act of 1996 
enables the Minister of Environment and Tourism to register a conservancy if it has 
a representative committee, a legal constitution, which provides for the sustainable 
management and utilisation of game in the conservancy, the ability to manage funds, 
an approved method for the equitable distribution of beneﬁ ts to members of the 
community and deﬁ ned boundaries. 
 These conditions were deliberately based on Ostrom’s design principles for 
long enduring common property resource management institutions (Jones  2010a ). 
Once the registration of a conservancy is published in the Government Gazette, 
the conservancy gains the ‘ownership’ of certain species of game designated as 
huntable game, which means the conservancy can hunt these species for its own 
use without a permit or quota from the government. The conservancy also quali-
ﬁ es for use rights through permitting and quota systems to hunt protected species 
of game, capture and sell game, and carry out trophy hunting. The area of land 
delimited by the conservancy boundaries is ofﬁ cially declared and the boundaries 
recorded in the Government Gazette. Typically, conservancies enter into con-
tracts with professional hunters for the use of their trophy hunting quotas and 
enter into agreements with private sector tourism companies to develop tourism 
facilities on their land. 
 There are three important features of the Namibian conservancy approach. First, 
it aims to provide the appropriate conditions for rural communities to conserve bio-
diversity on their land through the provision of property rights and incentives 
through the receipt of various types of beneﬁ t from wildlife including income. 
Second, the conservancy receives all income directly from its tourism and wildlife 
activities, so it does not receive this income from the state and does not have to share 
it with the state. Conservancies decide how to use their income with no interference 
from the state. Third, the system is rights-based, which means that communities 
receive clearly deﬁ ned rights over wildlife which are limited and conditional, but 
entrenched in legislation. 
 Conservancies do not receive land rights. Communal land is held in trust for the 
beneﬁ t of traditional communities by the state. This means that conservancies do 
not have the power to enforce land use planning and zoning decisions, particularly 
with regard to people moving in from outside the conservancy. This lack of secure 
group land tenure has signiﬁ cant negative effects on investment in tourism on com-
munal land, which are discussed later. 
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 Although rights over wildlife are clearly deﬁ ned in the 1996 legislation, tourism 
rights are more ambiguous. The Nature Conservation Amendment Act provides 
conservancies with rights to ‘non-consumptive use’ of wildlife which is further 
deﬁ ned as use for recreational purposes, but no further details are given. However, 
various government policies support community rights over tourism on their land. 
The Ministry of Environment and Tourism (MET) Policy on the Promotion of 
Community Based Tourism of  1995 recognises that where tourism is linked to wild-
life and wild landscapes, the beneﬁ ts to local communities can provide important 
incentives for conservation of these resources. The policy document states that 
MET will give recognised communal area conservancies the concessionary rights to 
lodge development within the conservancy boundaries. This approach is strength-
ened in the National Tourism Policy of 2008 which recognises conservancies as the 
primary mechanism by which beneﬁ ts from tourism should reach rural communi-
ties. However, there is as yet no tourism legislation to put this policy approach fully 
into effect. Despite the ambiguity in legislation, government has used the policies 
noted above to generally recognise the right of conservancies to develop tourism on 
their land and enter into contracts for lodge development with private tourism com-
panies. In addition, the Policy on Tourism and Wildlife Concessions on State Land 
(2007) enables the MET to allocate concessions in protected areas directly to local 
communities that have representative, accountable and stable community institu-
tions such as conservancies, and that are legal entities with the right to enter into 
contracts on behalf of a deﬁ ned community. 
 Although, as indicated above, conservancies do not acquire land rights, the 
Communal Land Reform Act of 2002 provides some recognition of conservancies 
with regard to the issue of leases for business rights. In terms of the Act, the 
Communal Land Boards may lease portions of communal land for business pur-
poses, including tourism. However, they may not issue a lease if the purpose for 
which the lease is proposed would defeat the objectives of a conservancy manage-
ment and utilisation plan. This provides conservancies with some legal protection 
against the establishment of land uses that conﬂ ict with the tourism and conserva-
tion objectives of conservancies. 
 The number of conservancies has grown rapidly since the ﬁ rst four were regis-
tered by MET in 1998. By 2007 there were 50 and by March 2013 the number had 
grown to 79 (see Fig.  2.1 below). The Namibian Association of Community-based 
Natural Resource Management Support Organisations (NACSO) compiles data 
annually on Namibian conservancies. Data are currently available for 2011 when 
there were 66 registered conservancies managing 146,312 km 2 of communal land 
and 17.8 % of Namibia’s land surface. 
 In sum, conservancies can be considered new institutional arrangements as they 
have provided communal area farmers with the legal and institutional mechanisms 
for maintaining wildlife on their land and gaining various forms of beneﬁ t from 
wildlife. These mechanisms did not exist before the 1996 legislation was introduced 
and do not exist for communities that do not form conservancies. Table  2.1 presents 
a summary of the main features of the conservancy approach.
B.T.B. Jones et al.
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2.3  The Drivers of Policy Change for the Conservancy 
Approach 
 A number of factors drove the policy shift that led to the emergence of conservan-
cies and community involvement in tourism (Jones  2010b ). The concept of sustain-
able use of wildlife as a conservation tool had already been established through the 
provision of rights over wildlife to white freehold farmers in the 1960s and 1970s. 
This move led to the increase in wildlife on freehold land as farmers no longer saw 
the wildlife as competing with livestock for grazing. Instead wildlife had gained a 
realisable ﬁ nancial value (Barnes and Jones  2009 ). According to Lindsey ( 2011 ), 
 Fig. 2.1  Communal area conservancies in Namibia (Source: NACSO  2013b ) 
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 Table 2.1  Main features of the conservancy approach in Namibia 
 Feature  Description 
 Main focus  Biodiversity conservation with improved livelihoods 
 Actors involved  Ministry of Environment and Tourism provides policy and legislation, 
provides some technical support to conservancies, and monitors compliance 
with the law 
 Donors provide funding support 
 NGOs provide technical and capacity building support to conservancies 
 Private sector provides the business and marketing expertise to maximise the 
value of the wildlife resources of conservancies 
 Conservancies receive rights over wildlife and tourism, manage wildlife and 
relationships with the private sector and distribute beneﬁ ts to members 
 Legal entity  National legislation provides use rights over wildlife and tourism to 
conservancies, which are legal entities with the power to acquire, hold and 
alienate property of every kind and with the capacity to acquire rights and 
obligations 
 Ownership  Conservancies own huntable game and gain use rights over other species subject 
to permits and quotas. Conservancies are recognised as concession holders over 
tourism lodge development within their boundaries. Land in communal areas is 
held in trust for the beneﬁ t of traditional communities by the State 
 Management  Conservancies carry out wildlife management activities through the 
appointment of their own game guards which are involved in wildlife 
monitoring, game counts and managing human-wildlife conﬂ ict. They also 
often set aside land for wildlife and photographic tourism. Conservancies 
enter into contractual arrangements with trophy hunting outﬁ tters and 
photographic tourism companies. Usually a joint management committee 
manages the contractual arrangements 
 Sources of 
ﬁ nance 
 Conservancies receive their own income through sustainable use of wildlife. 
They retain all income earned in this way – it is not channelled through 
government or shared with government. Donor and government funding 
provides resources for technical support to conservancies. Funding for trophy 
hunting comes from the trophy hunting company. Initially the main funding for 
photographic tourism (lodge) development came from the private sector. Donor 
funding has since been used to buy ownership of assets for one conservancy, 
equity in the business or a capital contribution to the business for others 
 Contribution to 
conservation 
 A sense of ownership over wildlife (property rights) and income from use of 
wildlife provide the conditions for communities to accept wildlife on their 
land. Most conservancies set land aside speciﬁ cally for wildlife and tourism, 
particularly around lodges. In many conservancies wildlife has been 
re-introduced including black rhino in some north-western conservancies. In 
some areas, particularly the north east where protected areas (PAs) are 
unfenced, conservancies provide connectivity between PAs and provide 
areas of compatible land use adjacent to PAs. In the north-east parks and 
conservancies are involved in various co-management activities at different 
scales 
 Contribution to 
livelihood 
 Conservancies directly receive various fees from trophy hunting and 
photographic tourism companies. This income is used for employment by 
the conservancy, various social projects, sometimes cash payments to 
members and re-investment in wildlife management (e.g. wildlife 
monitoring, game counts, anti-poaching, human wildlife conﬂ ict 
management). In addition the hunting and tourism operations in 
conservancies employ local people, sometimes to management level 
B.T.B. Jones et al.
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the increase in wildlife populations continues on freehold land in most areas with 
the percentage of mammal biomass comprised by wildlife rising from 8 % in 1972, 
to 18 % in 1992 and 29 % in 2011. 
 Prior to independence the work of conservationists with communities in the 
north-west of Namibia and Caprivi in the north-east had demonstrated that 
community- based approaches could work if based largely on the return of authority 
over wildlife to local people, backed by some form of ﬁ nancial return. The introduc-
tion of community game guards reporting to local headmen helped to restore a sense 
of ownership over wildlife and low amounts of income from small-scale tourism 
activities demonstrated to local people that wildlife could bring ﬁ nancial beneﬁ ts. 
The result was a decline in poaching and the start of a gradual recovery of wildlife 
populations, which would be continued through the establishment of conservancies 
(Long and Jones  2004 ). 
 Nelson and Agrawal ( 2008 ) note that Namibia’s independence and the opportu-
nities it created among policy makers catalysed the extension of the same privileges 
to communal lands that had already been established on white-owned freehold 
lands. The new policy and legislation was supported by the post-independence gov-
ernment. Providing the same rights over wildlife to black communal farmers that 
were enjoyed by white freehold farmers could be implemented as part of the gov-
ernment agenda of dismantling  apartheid in Namibia (Jones  2010b ). 
 Newsham ( 2007 ) identiﬁ ed a network of like-minded individuals working in 
conservation at independence that was able to drive policy reform that resonated 
with the agenda of the new government to abolish  apartheid in Namibia. This net-
work consisted of a coalition of government ofﬁ cials, NGO personnel and the new 
Minister of Wildlife, Conservation and Tourism, which was able to develop and 
present to parliament the legislation that would provide for the creation of commu-
nal area (Jones  2010b ). 
 This coalition of individuals was inﬂ uenced by challenges to the narrative of 
‘fortress’ conservation and the emergence of the counter-narrative of community- 
based conservation. Those driving reform in Namibia were linked to a broader net-
work of conservationists in southern Africa involved in promoting community-based 
approaches to conservation in neighbouring countries, such as the Communal Areas 
Management Programme for Indigenous Resources (CAMPFIRE) in Zimbabwe 
(Jones  2010b ). In addition, this southern African network had been inﬂ uenced by 
emerging thinking in common property resource management that suggested that 
groups of people could successfully cooperate to develop rules and practices for 
sustainably managing natural resources (e.g. Berkes  1989 ; Ostrom  1990 ). 
 A crucial point often overlooked, is that there was also demand for policy 
change from the bottom up. In the early 1990s, personnel from the new Ministry of 
Wildlife, Conservation and Tourism and Namibian NGOs carried out a series of 
socio- ecological surveys in communal areas. These surveys were internally led and 
funded. They revealed that while black communal farmers wanted something done 
about problem animals that damaged crops and killed livestock, they wanted to 
keep wildlife on their land. In addition, they were aware of the rights over wildlife 
given to white freehold farmers and wanted these rights extended to themselves 
(Jones  2010b ). 
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 By 1992 conservation ofﬁ cials had begun to work on the new conservancy policy 
that would pave the way for the development of new legislation giving communal 
area residents rights over wildlife and tourism. The same year a series of consulta-
tions and negotiations between USAID and the Namibian government and Namibian 
environmental organizations led to the establishment of the Living in a Finite 
Environment (LIFE) Programme which aimed at supporting Community-based 
Natural Resource Management (CBNRM) in Namibia. 
 This CBNRM agenda was not imposed by external donors. Namibian NGOs and 
government had already embarked on developing CBNRM as a conservation 
approach as described above. USAID and other donor assistance was used to enable 
local NGOs in particular to provide support to community involvement in wildlife 
and tourism before the legislation was changed. Once the new legislation was in 
place, donor funding enabled NGOs to assist communities to establish and operate 
conservancies (Jones  2004 ). 
 Finally, Nelson and Agrawal ( 2008 : 567) suggest that several other important 
factors also helped the development of the conservancy approach: “The combina-
tion of limited state control over tourist hunting revenues and concessions, low 
value of wildlife on communal lands prior to conservancy formation, transparent 
hunting administration procedures, and the generally high quality of national gover-
nance institutions all serve to reduce the incentives that state wildlife authorities in 
Namibia possess to resist devolution of wildlife management to local communi-
ties”. The main events in the development of Namibia’s conservancy approach are 
summarised in Table  2.2 .
 Table 2.2  Overview of the main events in the development of the conservancy approach in 
Namibia 
 Year  Main event 
 1984–
1990 
 Collaboration between conservationists and community leaders demonstrates that 
community involvement in conservation can halt poaching 
 1990–
1993 
 Socio-ecological surveys led by government conservation ofﬁ cials and NGO 
personnel indicate that local communities wish to keep wildlife on their land 
 1992  First draft of conservancy policy developed by conservation planners in 
government. Negotiations with USAID over support to CBNRM in Namibia 
 1993  Start of LIFE Project (ended 2010) 
 1995  Policy on Wildlife Management, Utilisation and Tourism in Communal Areas 
approved by Cabinet, states that rural communities should receive rights over 
wildlife and tourism through establishment of conservancies 
 Policy on the Promotion of Community Based Tourism approved by Ministry of 
Environment and Tourism – states that MET will give recognised conservancies the 
concessionary rights for lodge development which they can utilise themselves or 
lease to others within the conservancy boundaries 
 First Joint Venture Lodge contract signed between a community and private sector 
 1996  Nature Conservation Amendment Act of 1996 gives rights over wildlife and tourism 
to communities that form a conservancy 
 1998  First four conservancies registered by MET 
B.T.B. Jones et al.
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2.4  Community Involvement in Tourism Businesses 
in Conservancies 
 Conservancies have become central in the evolution of new institutional arrange-
ments for community involvement in tourism. The communal lands of north- western 
and north-eastern Namibia offer signiﬁ cant tourism attractions mostly absent from 
freehold land. Tourism companies have therefore become more interested in conser-
vancy areas where wildlife roams in unfenced areas with unspoilt scenery, com-
pared to the more ‘developed’ and fenced freehold farmland. This increased interest 
in tourism in conservancies led to the development of joint venture (JV) lodges 
where a conservancy would offer land to a private sector investor to build a tourism 
lodge in return for payments of various fees, such as bed-night fees or percentage of 
turnover, to the conservancy. The ﬁ rst such agreement was concluded in the Kunene 
Region by the residents of what is now Torra Conservancy and Wilderness Safaris 
in 1995. The legal rights given to conservancies and policy statements from govern-
ment provided an overall environment in which private sector investors were 
expected to enter into negotiations with conservancies if they wished to engage in 
tourism activities within the conservancy boundaries. As a result, by 2011, there 
were 32 formal JV lodges on conservancy land (NACSO  2013a ). A number of 
lodges was in place prior to the establishment of the conservancies, thus necessitat-
ing retrospective development of joint venture agreements. 
 The ﬁ rst JV lodges in conservancies were developed according to a simple model 
where the conservancy operated essentially as a landlord, and ownership and manage-
ment were in private hands. However, there has since been an increasing shift away 
from the landlord-tenant relationship to the promotion of some form of conservancy 
ownership. For instance, in 2005 the ?Koadi //Hoas conservancy became the ﬁ rst con-
servancy to own lodge assets and in 2011 became the ﬁ rst conservancy to own the 
lodge business, while hiring a management company to run the operations. This devel-
opment reﬂ ects broader shifts in thinking concerning community involvement in tour-
ism. For example, Elliott and Sumba ( 2011 ) discuss different models of community 
relationship with the private sector used by the African Wildlife Foundation. The model 
most used is one described as community ownership–private sector management (see 
Chaps.  11 and  12 , this volume). The Namibian government is keen to promote com-
munity ownership of enterprises as part of its policy of Black Economic Empowerment 
(BEE) aimed at shifting ownership of businesses from predominantly white-owned to 
predominantly black-owned. For example the MET’s Policy on Tourism and Wildlife 
Concessions on State Land states the following (MET  2007 : 13):
 MET’s ﬁ rst preference is that communities should own and manage concessions awarded 
to them and any business enterprise derived from that, and MET is committed to assist com-
munities to achieve this objective to the greatest possible extent. 
 In addition, the policy aims to promote the acquisition of shares in the business 
by the community. 
 As with the conservancy legislation itself, the Joint Venture approach intends to 
maximise the sense of ownership as well as the generation of income from the lodge 
operations, based on the expectation that a combination of property rights and 
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sustained income will help to create the appropriate conditions for sustainable 
resource management. Figure  2.2 tries to illustrate this conceptualisation. Enterprise 
A is a tourism lodge with ownership and management by the private sector, paying 
fees to the community. It can generate a high return to the community but there is 
little sense of ownership. In this case, according to CBNRM theory, the business is 
less likely to optimise community commitment towards the management of the sur-
rounding environment. Enterprise B is a community owned and run campsite, that 
generates far less income to the community than Enterprise A, but should generate 
more commitment from the communities to look after their environment, due to the 
higher degree of ownership. Enterprise C is a community owned lodge, but  managed 
by a private management company through a contract with the conservancy. In this 
case there should be a high level of community ownership matched with a high level 
of income to the local communities, which should theoretically lead to community 
commitment to sustainable management of natural resources. 
 Support to the development of Joint Venture partnerships in Namibia has led to 
the emergence of several models for community involvement in tourism. The main 
JV enterprise models are described next, followed by a discussion of their advan-
tages and disadvantages, based on observation and analysis of these models in the 
ﬁ eld by the authors. 
2.4.1  Model 1: Ownership and Management by the Private 
Sector Partner Which Pays Some Fees to the Community 
 Currently the predominant management model for a lodge operating in a conser-
vancy has been the ‘build, operate and (in some cases) transfer of ownership of the 
assets’ approach. The White Lady Lodge in Tsiseb Conservancy is an example of 
 Fig. 2.2  The theoretical link between increased ownership income for conservancies from tourism 
lodges and sustainable resource management (Adapted from Bond  1999 ) 
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this model (see Lapeyre, this volume). In this scenario a lodge operator enters a joint 
venture agreement with a conservancy, and the conservancy agrees to support and 
in some cases obtains the appropriate tenure rights 2 for the business as well as man-
aging the surrounding environment. The lodge operator provides the capital and 
builds, manages and markets the lodge at its own expense. In return, the lodge oper-
ator will ensure that employment (within reason) comes from the conservancy area 
and a fee (which is generally based on the lodge performance) is paid to the conser-
vancy account. This fee is important as it covers the conservancy management costs 
as well as contributing towards social community projects or supporting local resi-
dents with the cost of living with wildlife. This model can bring relatively good 
returns to the conservancy, accompanied by low exposure to risk and low involve-
ment in the business for the conservancy. It is the least complicated arrangement, 
but also one with the least sense of ownership by the conservancy. 
 Nevertheless, the sense of ownership and engagement can be considerably 
enhanced if there are effective mechanisms for involving the conservancy, for exam-
ple if senior management staff members are from the local community; if there are 
regular joint management committee meetings at which issues such as ﬁ nancial 
performance are discussed; and above all, if there is good communication and 
mutual respect between the operator and conservancy. This is the case with the 
Damaraland Camp lodge in the Torra Conservancy which was originally developed 
according to this model (with an option for shareholding at a later stage). Since the 
inception of Damaraland Camp, the community has had a high  sense of ownership 
because of the early positive relationship with the operator, Wilderness Safaris (see 
below for more details). 
2.4.2  Model 2: Private Sector Partner “Owns” the Proﬁ t 
and Loss, with Conservancy Providing Capital 
 In contrast to Model 1, where the private sector builds, owns and manages the lodge, 
in this model the conservancy contributes capital to the construction of the lodge. 
2.4.2.1  Model 2a: Conservancy Part Finances Lodge Development 
with Private Sector 
 The Nkasa Lupala Lodge model is based on a straightforward build-and-operate 
relationship between the private sector and Wuparo Conservancy in Zambezi 
Region. The conservancy received a grant from the US-funded Millennium 
Challenge Account-Namibia (MCA-N) that allowed it to contribute towards the 
capital investment required for the construction of the lodge. In return, the conser-
vancy was able to negotiate a high fee as a percentage of turnover and the operator 
2
  Usually the leasehold rights. 
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had additional funds to increase the level of marketing. The return to conservancies 
is higher than for Model 1, with marginally more involvement. However, the con-
servancy has to access signiﬁ cant capital ﬁ nancing. This approach does not neces-
sarily increase the sense of ownership by the conservancy, as the capital contribution 
was made in form of a loan to the business rather than equity (because this is more 
tax efﬁ cient for the business). However, it enables the conservancy to leverage 
higher returns from the business. 
 Unless conservancies can access 100 % of the capital requirement, providing a 
loan for a higher return is generally thought better than a minority equity sharehold-
ing where experience has shown that conservancies do not receive the expected 
dividends (see Model 3). 
2.4.2.2  Model 2b: Conservancy Fully Owns the Lodge but the Private 
Sector Owns the Business 
 There are a few examples where a conservancy has been able to access sufﬁ cient 
ﬁ nance to ensure a 100 % capital ownership of the ﬁ xed assets of the lodge. The ﬁ rst 
example in Namibia was the Grootberg Lodge in ?Khoadi //Hoas Conservancy in 
the north-west, which opened in 2005 and was ﬁ nanced by the EU-funded Namibia 
Tourism Development Programme. The rationale behind this was that returns to 
conservancies in conventional joint venture deals are often constrained in the early 
years of an agreement because of the need for private sector partners to repay the 
ﬁ nancing required for capital development and having this covered through donor 
funding should allow a more immediate ﬁ nancial return to the conservancy. More 
recently, the Etendeka Camp in the north-west was ﬁ nanced through a MET GEF 
funded project, a grant from the MCA-N and a soft loan. The conservancies then 
decided to enter into an operator’s agreement, where they transferred their business 
ownership and responsibilities to a private sector company that would run the day-
to- day operations and marketing under the company’s own account. In return, the 
conservancies received two sets of fees, a concession fee of 8 % on turnover and 
7 % of turnover building rent. 
 In principle, the fact that the conservancy, rather than the commercial partner, 
provides the capital for assets means that the income to the conservancy should 
be greater and there should not be any signiﬁ cant time lag in payments. In the 
case of the Grootberg Lodge there was a strong sense of ownership and sense of 
pride shown by lodge employees, which had a signiﬁ cant positive impact on the 
guest experience. There are a number of JV lodges using this structure in Kenya, 
and one of the main problems is with maintenance and upgrading. Given that the 
conservancy is not closely involved in the day-to-day management, its leaders 
may be reluctant to allocate sufﬁ cient money for essential repair and mainte-
nance. However, with appropriate attention this potential problem can be 
addressed. A budget can be agreed that takes into account the repair and mainte-
nance cost for the year which is then backed up by a reserve account that caters 
for unexpected costs. 
B.T.B. Jones et al.
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2.4.3  Model 3: Conservancy Owns Equity 
in a Lodge Ownership and Management Company 
 A shareholding approach may give a sense of ownership without exposing the con-
servancy to higher levels of risk as in other models that aim to increase ownership, 
and if the minority shareholders can also appoint one or more directors, it may allow 
the conservancy to acquire more understanding of how the business works. 
 A ﬁ rst example of this model is Doro !nawas Camp in the neighbouring Doro 
!nawas Conservancy that was partly ﬁ nanced by the DFID-funded Business Linkage 
Challenge Fund which resulted in 45 % of the shares in the lodge company being 
owned by the conservancy. However, Doro !nawas has still not generated dividends 
after almost 10 years. Small lodges generally do not make high proﬁ ts unless they 
operate at very high occupancy. Return to operators usually comes in the form of 
lifestyle or capital appreciation. If they form part of a vertically integrated business 
combined with tour operations, proﬁ ts are usually made in other sections of the 
business than the board and lodging component. 
 The original 15-year contract between Torra Conservancy and Wilderness Safaris 
for the Damaraland Camp in north-west Namibia had most of the characteristics of 
Model 1, although there was also an option that during years 11–15, 20 % of camp 
ownership could be transferred per year to the conservancy, accompanied by a 20 % 
reduction in the rental fee paid by Wilderness Safaris. At the end of the agreement, 
it was necessary to renovate the lodge, and since Torra did not have sufﬁ cient funds 
to contribute their share, Wilderness bought back its shares. 
2.4.4  Model 4: Conservancy Owns the Lodge and the Business 
and Outsources the Management to Private Sector 
Partner 
 The Grootberg Lodge model in ?Khoadi //Hoas Conservancy, referred to above, has 
evolved further into an enterprise where the conservancy now owns the business itself 
as well as the lodge assets. The ownership structure of the lodge changed in 2012 so 
that the conservancy established a wholly owned subsidiary company, Grootberg Pty, 
which is responsible for the operations of the lodge. The former joint venture partner 
is still responsible for marketing and management. Members of the conservancy man-
agement committee sit on the board of Grootberg Pty. This change in structure took 
place at the same time as a major upgrade in the facilities, which was part funded by 
a MCA-N grant and partly by soft loans. There are two revenue streams for the con-
servancy. One is a continuation of the existing rental fee paid by the operating com-
pany (now a wholly owned subsidiary) to the conservancy, but in addition once the 
loans are paid off, and provided that the lodge continues to operate well, all the proﬁ ts 
after payment of corporation tax will go to the conservancy. The conservancy will, 
however have to provide for further capital and maintenance expenses. 
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 Through ownership of the business, this approach fundamentally changes the 
relationship between the conservancy and the private sector and provides the com-
munity with the ownership that government policy is promoting. If the business 
does well, the conservancy should receive signiﬁ cantly higher returns than under 
models 1 and 2. However, it is also fully exposed to the risks associated with a 
downturn in business. This implies that the conservancy might need to subsidise 
tourism operations from income derived from other activities and also has to repay 
loans. The management partner is not exposed to the downside of the risk that they 
are managing on a day-to-day basis, and as a result may be more inclined to take 
hazardous decisions, especially if they are inappropriately incentivised. 
 The conservancy also has to ensure that it does not siphon off income from the 
lodge that should be reserved for maintenance of assets and future capital reinvest-
ment, particularly as it is difﬁ cult to raise capital for investments on communal land 
(see below for a more detailed discussion of the constraints involved). There is also 
risk involved in the use of inexperienced conservancy committee members as board 
members for the business, although there are two external experts (a lawyer and a 
private sector tourism operator) also appointed to the board at Grootberg. 
Conservancy committee members serve a certain term after which they may be 
voted out of ofﬁ ce by the conservancy. If a committee member who is also a 
board member loses ofﬁ ce in the conservancy, he/she would have to resign as 
a board member and a new and potentially inexperienced person would take over 
the board position. 
 Because of the need for conservancy representatives on the board of the subsid-
iary company to take on a much greater ﬁ duciary responsibility than in their role as 
conservancy committee members, this model has required, and will probably 
 continue to require, a much higher level of technical support from NGOs than more 
conventional approaches. 
2.4.5  Model 5: Conservancy Owns and Manages the Business 
and the Assets and Has No Private Sector Partner 
 The Bush Lodge in Puros Conservancy in Kunene Region is wholly owned and 
operated by the conservancy. This kind of arrangement is often seen as the desired 
end point for tourism development. There are many small scale examples of com-
munity owned and operated campsites, but these generally operate relatively infor-
mally, rather than as proper tourism businesses, and even in the case of the Bush 
Lodge do not have separate bank accounts from the main conservancy one. 
 Another related approach is that of the Conservancy Safaris Namibia (CSN) 
business which belongs to a group of ﬁ ve conservancies in north-west Namibia. 
Using a soft loan from a private investor, CSN has established a mid-market lodge 
and runs mobile tours through the member conservancies as well as some hunting 
operations. They have contracted out the hunting and engaged external senior 
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management personnel. It is set up as a trust, with some external trustees that join 
the representatives from the ﬁ ve conservancies. The ﬁ ve conservancy representa-
tives have been drawn from the broader community, based on merit rather than 
membership of conservancy committees. This ensures a total separation of powers 
between CSN as the community company and conservancies, and reduces the likeli-
hood of a conﬂ ict of interest, but means that there is no automatic democratic link 
between the conservancy and its representatives. Also day-to-day decisions are 
taken by a non-local management team. 
 Under this model the conservancies own the assets and the business and are also 
responsible for the operation of the business. Theoretically this model could also 
provide the highest percentage return on investment, depending on the success of 
the business. It does provide the highest level of ownership over the business. 
However, the exposure to risk is the highest with at the same time probably the least 
capacity for resilience to cope with a severe down turn in business. In practice com-
munities seldom have the skills to run tourism businesses effectively without exter-
nal support, because of the specialist skills in areas such as marketing, customer 
relations, stock management, etc. that are required. An example of such an arrange-
ment from Kenya is the Il Ngwesi Lodge which has been going for almost 20 years 
but provides very little return to the conservancy despite substantial donor input. 
Nonetheless, it does generate employment and a strong sense of ownership. 
2.4.6  Comparative Analysis of the Models 
 The analysis of the models described above raises important issues regarding insti-
tutional arrangements for community involvement in tourism. The models indicate 
a shift from communities as landlords earning various fees, to communities as own-
ers and operators of assets and businesses. This shift is what government and others 
wish to promote. The move towards community ownership would also appear to be 
an important component of the conditions for promoting sustainable natural resource 
management on communal land in terms of Namibian policy and legislation. 
 However, the concept of community ownership raises a number of key issues: 
does ownership provide better returns for communities, or does ownership expose 
them to risks they are not well-positioned to cope with? To what extent are the insti-
tutions established for natural resource management suited to commercial operations 
and manage possible conﬂ icts of interest for representatives with multiple roles? 
 As landlords, conservancies have an uncomplicated relationship with the private 
sector and their exposure to risk is considerably reduced. Income can be high and 
there is a degree of security in receiving an income ﬂ ow. On the surface the sense of 
ownership is also likely to be low, although this need not always be the case. 
Although the Damaraland Camp in Torra Conservancy originally operated as a 
Model 1 enterprise, and for many years the community did not have a share in 
equity in the lodge, community members nevertheless had a strong sense of ownership 
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and pride in the camp (Jones  2008 ). This was partly because the company agreed 
that the original PTO certiﬁ cate should be in the name of the conservancy, partly 
because conservancy members have been trained to management level, and partly 
because the spirit in which the company initially managed the lodge helped to foster 
a sense of partnership rather than a simple landlord-tenant relationship (Jones  2008 ). 
 When conservancies move into more complicated relationships which involve 
some form of ownership they begin to run into important conﬂ icts of interest. If the 
private sector tenant breaks the agreement with a conservancy, it is relatively easy 
for the conservancy to remove the tenant and ﬁ nd another. However, it is more dif-
ﬁ cult to sever the relationship if the conservancy is a business partner of the private 
sector company or partly owner of the assets with the private sector. The provision 
of equity to conservancies could be used as an excuse for companies to pay divi-
dends to conservancies rather than to make direct payments such as rental fees. It is 
relatively easy for companies to decide not to pay dividends, compared to deciding 
not to pay rent. 
 In the business structure described in Model 4 above, conservancy committee 
members are expected to play two roles: as representatives of the conservancy – an 
organisation which exists primarily to carry out conservation and to provide social 
beneﬁ ts to its members – or as directors of a company, with tightly deﬁ ned obliga-
tions under the Companies Act, and the possibility of being found criminally liable 
in the event of mismanagement. 
 Again there are potential conﬂ icts of interest between these two roles. For 
instance a decision might need to be made whether to buy a vehicle for lodge opera-
tions, in which case beneﬁ ts to the conservancy would be reduced in that year, and 
might make it impossible for them to buy a vehicle for wildlife protection. In addi-
tion, conservancy committee members generally do not have the experience and 
background in tourism business that is required to carry out the role of company 
director effectively, including taking responsibility for meeting the compliance of 
the Companies Act. And, even if the conservancy representatives have the experi-
ence to carry out their roles effectively, they still face the potential for conﬂ icts of 
interest between their roles as company directors and conservancy ofﬁ cials, which 
they will need to be aware of and address. 
 Another important factor is that as conservancy ownership increases so does the 
exposure to risk. Tourism businesses often go through difﬁ cult times in terms of 
cash ﬂ ow at start up, during low season or as a result of unexpected circumstances. 
It is important to be able to access operating capital in order to cover short falls dur-
ing this time. There are three ways to deal with negative cash ﬂ ows: by injecting 
personal cash; by a bank loan or overdraft facility; or by bringing in additional 
partners. 
 None of these options are readily available to conservancies. Bank loans and 
overdrafts usually require some security, and conservancies seldom have assets that 
could be realistically taken over by a bank in the event of default. This is partly 
because conservancies do not own the land on which lodges are built. Because com-
munal land is held in trust by the state, banks do not accept land as security for loans 
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for developments in communal areas. This remains an important constraint to 
investment on communal land by the private sector and weakens the position of 
conservancies that own tourism businesses. In addition, to remain competitive in 
tourism, upgrades are necessary, and these require cash injections which need to be 
provided for in the business plan for the lodge. 
 Therefore the most likely ways for conservancies to respond to negative cash 
ﬂ ow in a conservancy operated facility would be as follows: freeze on staff pay, both 
for the enterprise and conservancy; sale of assets such as vehicles – usually at below 
market prices; reduce community beneﬁ ts; bring in other investors and reducing full 
level of ownership and exposure to risk. 
 Such circumstances would undermine the overall aim of conservancies and 
reduce their ability to generate beneﬁ ts to their members. Further, experience shows 
that communities are necessarily averse to taking risks. Businesses aim to do well 
and make proﬁ ts; just as often they perform badly and require further capital injec-
tions, or they fail entirely. Communities cannot easily afford the cost of business 
failure. This means that when entering into business relationships they will want to 
avoid exposure to the full risk of managing a business, and conversely cannot expect 
to reap the full rewards of better than expected performance. 
 Conservancies are established to manage natural resources and have a strong 
governance structure, usually with a relatively large committee to represent the 
scattered communities in these remote areas. Representatives are elected for a 
number of reasons, mostly connected with how they are respected within their 
communities. They are not elected for their business acumen or entrepreneurial 
skills. Converting this kind of leadership structure into one that can effectively 
manage a business is not easy. In some cases the entire committee attempts to man-
age a business. In others they have employed staff to whom more or less responsi-
bility is delegated. In the case of Grootberg Lodge there are ex-ofﬁ cio positions on 
the board of the subsidiary company and in the case of Conservancy Safaris 
Namibia, unelected individuals are selected. None of these systems provide both 
democratic validity and efﬁ cient strategic direction for businesses. Part of the 
problem is that in most conservancies there is no-one with the relevant skills and 
experience to direct a modern tourism business, but even where there is, that per-
son is more likely to work for his or her own beneﬁ t rather than for a communal 
enterprise. Some tourism skills, such as marketing, are highly specialised and will 
almost inevitably be outsourced. 
 Thus there is a real tension between community ownership and management and 
commercial success. Without some degree of partnership with the private sector, it 
is likely that larger scale communal tourism operations will perform poorly, and as 
a broad generalisation, it is more likely that a move towards community control will 
lead to a reduction in commercial viability than an improvement (unless there are 
speciﬁ c improvements related to marketing or to the visitor experience). The chal-
lenge is thus to ﬁ nd the appropriate intermediate position for each local set of cir-
cumstance that maximises overall commercial success, community beneﬁ ts and 
community sense of ownership. 
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2.5  Prospects and Challenges for the Conservancy Approach 
 The main prospects and challenges related to the conservancy approach relate to 
conserving wildlife, contributing to livelihoods and governance. 
2.5.1  Conserving Wildlife 
 NACSO ( 2013a ) suggests that conservancies have brought about important changes 
on communal land. Conservancies engage in a number of different wildlife manage-
ment activities. Many set aside land speciﬁ cally for wildlife and tourism as part of 
zonation of land uses in their management plans. Most employ community game 
guards that use a standardised system to monitor wildlife and other resources. 
Conservancies annually commit human and other resources to game counts carried 
out jointly with MET and NGOs. 
 In some regions conservancies adjacent to protected areas provide corridors of 
connectivity to other conservation areas and thus enlarge the area under sustainable 
resource management, enabling landscape level co-management institutions and 
activities to emerge (NACSO  2013a ). 
 Wildlife has increased in the same way that numbers of wild animals increased 
on freehold land following the provision of property rights over wildlife to white 
farmers. Well-documented increases of ungulates have taken place in the conser-
vancy areas of north-western Namibia, particularly springbok, oryx, mountain zebra 
and giraffe, and the numbers of elephant, black rhino and lion have also increased 
signiﬁ cantly (NACSO  2013a ). Springbok in conservancy areas of the north-west, 
for example, have recovered from a low of around a few thousand in 1982 to around 
160,000. While some of the growth in numbers can be attributed to increased rain-
fall after the droughts of the late 1970s and early 1980s, conservationists agree the 
recoveries would not have been possible without community involvement leading to 
a signiﬁ cant reduction in poaching. 
 In the north-east there have also been signiﬁ cant recoveries of wildlife, particu-
larly elephant and buffalo, impala and zebra partly due to natural increase, a reduc-
tion of poaching as well as immigration from neighbouring countries (NACSO 
 2013a ). Black rhino have been re-introduced to some north-western communal con-
servancies by the government demonstrating the extent to which communities are 
capable of successfully managing their wildlife. Conservancies provide the institu-
tional mechanism for re-introducing wildlife to communal lands through their man-
agement activities and conservation staff. Over the past 13 years, 8,388 animals of 
15 species have been translocated to communal conservancies, and in some cases 
the introductions enabled populations of existing species to recover to former num-
bers (NACSO  2013a ). Many of the translocated animals have been donated by MET 
from state-owned protected areas and by freehold farmers. The cost of capture and 
transport has been borne by the MCA-N, NGOs and MET. 
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2.5.2  Contributing to Livelihoods 
 In 2011 conservancies earned a total of N$36,377,109 (USD 5.2 million) in direct 
cash income and there were further non-cash beneﬁ ts (mainly in the form of meat 
from various forms of hunting) worth N$10,366,289 (USD 1.5 million) (NACSO 
 2013a ). The main sources of income were photographic and hunting tourism. Joint 
venture tourism contributed nearly N$19 million (USD 2.7 million) or 40.5 % of 
conservancy income in 2011 and trophy hunting N$14.1 million (USD 2 million) or 
30.2 % of conservancy income. 
 In the 57 conservancies that provided data, 665 people were employed directly 
by the conservancies in 2011 and tourism enterprises in conservancies generated 
another 696 full time and 1,608 part-time/casual jobs (NACSO  2013a ). 
 Apart from employment conservancies provide a range of other beneﬁ ts to mem-
bers. These include social projects and services such as soup kitchens for the elderly, 
provision of water (e.g. to schools), donations to schools, upgrading of roads, trans-
port to clinics, etc. Some conservancies provide annual cash payments to members. 
Conservancies help members to address human-wildlife conﬂ ict through payments 
to offset livestock or crop losses, protection of water points from elephants and land 
use zonation. The impacts of these beneﬁ ts to members do not necessarily  contribute 
directly to poverty reduction, but do help to alleviate poverty (Jones et al.  2013 ). 
The main contribution to poverty reduction is probably through the creation of jobs 
that can lift people out of poverty. Employment provides a steady income that can 
be used to build up household assets and a local cash economy. Also the conser-
vancy and related tourism jobs are linked to considerable training and capacity 
building that develop new skills and in turn open up new employment opportunities. 
In addition, empowerment (i.e. devolving legal rights) and developing new civil 
society structures are important contributing factors for promoting democracy in 
rural areas. This is particularly signiﬁ cant given Namibia’s  apartheid legacy that 
left rural Namibians politically marginalised. 
2.5.3  Governance Challenges 
 Despite these successes of the conservancy approach, there are a number of 
 implementation challenges which need to be addressed. The lack of secure group 
land tenure on communal land in Namibia remains a constraint to investment on 
communal land. It is mainly the large tourism companies that can afford to take the 
risk of investing on communal land without land ownership or the ability to easily 
raise bank loans. For communities themselves it is difﬁ cult to maintain their exclu-
sive wildlife and tourism zones against the inﬂ ux of outsiders looking for grazing 
land. Subsequent to the 1996 conservancy legislation, the government introduced a 
land law in 2002 that required businesses such as tourism lodges to acquire leases 
from Communal Land Boards, replacing the old PTO system. The law prevents land 
boards from issuing leases for businesses that would be in conﬂ ict with conservancy 
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management plans. Theoretically this provision should ensure that no leases for 
tourism businesses are issued within a conservancy unless the business owner has 
an agreement with the conservancy. However, there are examples of land boards 
issuing leases for lodges without the conservancy involvement, thus undermining 
government policy on tourism in communal lands. Further, the land boards have the 
potential to begin charging high lease fees which reduce the ﬁ nancial viability of 
lodges that are also paying fees to conservancies. 
 An additional challenge to implementation is ensuring that there is good governance 
within conservancies. Key problems identiﬁ ed include the following (NACSO  2013a ):
 (a)  In some conservancies, committees were taking all the major decisions them-
selves without involving members; 
 (b)  Members were not being given the opportunity to approve conservancy budgets 
drafted by committees; 
 (c)  In a few cases large sums of money were unaccounted for; 
 (d)  Some committee members voted themselves large loans; 
 (e)  Many conservancies spent all their income on operational costs (including 
allowances for committee members) leaving little for community beneﬁ t; 
  (f)  In many conservancies there was little involvement of members in developing 
constitutions. 
 NGOs and the government play a major role in helping conservancies to address 
the problems. Considerable effort is going into the revision of constitutions and 
conservancy beneﬁ t distribution plans with as much participation by members as 
possible. Conservancy committees are being encouraged to ensure that budgets are 
tabled for approval by members at Annual General Meetings and annual ﬁ nancial 
statements are made available to members. However, good governance will only 
emerge if the stakes are high enough – i.e. if the amounts of money being squan-
dered by conservancy committees are high enough for conservancy members to 
invest time and effort in calling the committees to account. Once conservancies 
begin to earn sufﬁ cient income, members start to take a greater interest in what is 
being done with the income and take action against committee members. 
2.6  Conclusions 
 The conservation policy and legislation have provided new institutional arrange-
ments for rural communities in Namibia to regain some control over the natural 
resources on their land and to beneﬁ t from the use of these resources. Although rights 
over tourism are less institutionally embedded in rules and regulations, conservan-
cies have been the primary means for rural communities to become involved in tour-
ism and beneﬁ t from tourism activities on their land. Conservancies have in some 
cases moved from being land lords to owners of lodge assets and tourism 
businesses. More time is needed to see whether communities are willing to accept 
the increased business risk that accompanies ownership and whether ownership will 
indeed bring sufﬁ cient increased income which will be an acceptable trade-off for 
the increased risk. 
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